Great film by Michael Watts broadcast earlier this month on Al Jazeera looking at the problems caused when multinational corporations are allowed to settle cases of human rights complicity out of court. The example used is the suppression of local resistance to British company Monterrico's massive Rio Blanco copper mine in Peru.

Nice video: 1987 Nobel Peace Prize winner Oscar Arias tells the story of how Costa Rica abolished its army, liberating hundreds of millions of dollars to be spent on genuine human security. End the business of war!

At the end of last year, South Africa’s National Assembly, the lower house of the parliament, passed the highly contentious Protection of State Information Bill. Better known as the ‘Secrecy Bill’, the proposed legislation relates to the “protection and preservation of all things owned or maintained for the public by the state” against foreign spies, but would in effect deny the country’s own citizens, particularly the poor, an accountable and transparent state.

Earlier this year I visited Palestine for the first time. Ahead of my arrival, I found gaining an understanding of the situation almost impenetrable; the blur of arguments and counter arguments developed over a complex history left me feeling confused and uncertain.

A great video from Stop the War to mark the 10th anniversary of the catastrophic occupation of Afghanistan - words by Tony Benn, music by Brian Eno.

This is a shameless plug for Tweets from Tahrir the book I've just edited.

Don't miss this great new Guardian video interview with Omar Barghouti, co-founding member of the Palestinian BDS National Committee.

How many US military bases are there across the world? It seems no one actually knows. According to this new article by Nick Turse, editor of The Case for Withdrawal from Afghanistan, the real total is over 1,000. However, even the Pentagon's own calculations fail to mention numerous bases that are known to exist in the Gulf states and Iraq.

The neo-con Project for the New American Century proposed the creation of a worldwide network of US operating bases as the platform from which to extend the continued projection of US force into the future. Some of these would be major bases, fully equipped and housing substantial forces; others would be 'deployment bases' allowing for rapid intervention into new conflict areas. For more insight into this and into how US planners see the world in general, it's still worth reading the Project's report on future military strategy: Rebuilding America's Defenses.

Thanks to our friends in the Jewish Socialists' Group for reprinting Karma Nabulsi's thoughtful piece from the London Review of Books in the most recent issue of Jewish Socialist. The original should be read in its entirety, but I particularly liked the following passage where she reflects on the Palestinian experience in the context of broader revolutionary history:

"Even a cursory study of the history of revolutions over the last 300 years reveals three elements essential to their origins. First, a plethora of revolutionary pamphlets, declarations and discussions issuing from different factions together begin to shape a shared understanding of the injustices that have to be overturned. A call to arms requires a convincing appraisal of the balance of forces if enough people are to be persuaded to embark on such a risky enterprise. The history of Palestinian attempts to achieve freedom would give anyone pause: two generations who tried lie buried in the cemeteries of more than two dozen countries.

"Second, it is revolutionaries who make revolutions, and not the other way around. During the national mobilisation of the 1960s and 1970s, some joined the party, others the movement, but most simply joined the Palestinian revolution. It was taken for granted that one belonged to one of the parties, which were themselves embedded in the broader national liberation movement under the umbrella of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, a formal institution set up in 1964 by Arab states, which was captured from the Palestinian elite by the resistance groups a few years later. Empowered by becoming part of a fast-moving popular revolution, Palestinians – exiled, scattered and defeated as they were – achieved the two elusive things they have constantly sought: representation and unity.

"If you raise the painful subject of this earlier time among Palestinians today, the usual effect is to revive the over-theoretical debate about when exactly the revolution died. (A discussion of its strengths and weaknesses would be more useful.) Some say it ended after Black September in Jordan in 1970; others that it ended in 1975 at the start of the Lebanese civil war. The majority see Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982, which brought about the comprehensive destruction of the PLO’s infrastructure, as having killed it off. The communiqués and declarations issued during the first Intifada, which took place in the occupied Palestinian territories between 1987 and 1993, were expressed in the language of revolution, but everyone agrees that it was all over by 1991, when the Madrid peace process was accepted on such unequal terms. That entire period of Palestinian history has fallen into disrepute for a number of reasons – not least having to watch its ghoulish remains driving around in official cars in Ramallah or posing at the White House – so the benefits are never assessed, or potentially useful lessons drawn.

"Unity and representation are the common goods Palestinians must realise in order to advance their cause, and these clearly can’t be achieved via any of the options currently being suggested to us: not the distribution of the PA’s power between Hamas and Fatah (since the only representative institutional structure for all Palestinians is the Palestinian National Council, the parliament-in-exile of the PLO); not a US-sponsored peace process; and not the plan for Palestinian statehood proposed by the prime minister, Salam Fayyad, according to which the institutions of an independent state will be built in the face of a still expanding military occupation. Already by the 1970s, thanks to its fluid institutional architecture, the revolution was able to overcome national borders, protect its independence from the Arab regimes and convey its demands to the solidarity movements who supported it and exerted pressure on its behalf. Other national liberation movements of the 1960s and 1970s – the FLN, ANC, Swapo, the Sandinistas – had to operate with their leaders underground and in exile, developing their strategy outside the country while the population remained rooted in the land they hoped to liberate. For Palestinians, whose national politics were undone in an instant over a single year in 1948, it took the concerted actions of tens of thousands of cadres across the region to hold the people together while at the same time putting sufficient pressure on those governments, both Western and Arab, that would have preferred to see us capitulate to Israel. The mood of that short period, as I remember it, was profoundly popular and democratic: pluralist, multi-party, universalist, secular and highly progressive. Palestinians who dared not join in – businessmen, academics, the money-grubbing classes – were carried along in its wake, and obeyed its mandate. Today we could not be further from that fleeting moment of unity the revolution once afforded.

"The experience of revolutionary life is difficult to describe. It is as much metaphysical as imaginative, combining urgency, purposefulness, seriousness and hard work, with a near celebratory sense of adventure and overriding optimism – a sort of carnival atmosphere of citizens’ rule. Key to its success is that this heightened state is consciously and collectively maintained by tens of thousands of people at the same time. If you get tired for a few hours or days, you know others are holding the ring.

"The third, counterintuitive feature of revolutions is that they are usually launched by astonishingly small groups of individuals. The Palestinian revolution was no exception. Young Palestinians today, caught in the grind of their daily struggle, feel unable to make contact with their own past: its stories are like fairytales, out of their reach. The appropriate model for the emergence of the Palestinian movement of the 1960s and 1970s isn’t the Leninist vanguard party but the revolutions that established democracies in 19th-century Europe, where the acts of a few were matched, and then rapidly overtaken, by an entire nation, all of whose members considered themselves leaders. No one here waits around for instructions.

"What usually goes unmentioned in the history books is the dangerous and seemingly interminable slog that is required to build up to any revolution’s launch: it may take years, even decades, once the match is lit, for it to ignite a mobilisation large enough to create a truly national initiative."

Oh yes, this is the Philly BDS Flashdance (Philadelphia & Boycott Divestment Sanctions for those of you who don't speak in acronyms) coming at ya courtesy of the Electronic Intifada....